[Zekta] whispers: Goblin Wisdom - Grind won't make you rich, but they cure empty stomach.

Jun 28 2010

Good Laugh to share

Zekta Chan
Zekta Chan

laughter-funny-cat-laugh (1)

In this early Monday Morning, if you did already heard Seth’s new podcast yet (unlike me, having a busy weekend), may be I can entertain you with laughter I enjoyed last week…

I am not sure if many of you follow isheepthings.com,
but I had come to this gem on isheepthings.com by Aurdon last week.
A hate whisper conversation from one of our fellow trader.
I can’t stop laughing when I was on my way to work. All passengers in my subway cart stares at me funnily.
Trolls are entertaining when someone had the sense of humor to play with them…
Good take, Aurdon :)

http://www.isheepthings.com/blog/gold-is-the-new-green/

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| posted in Wow Econ Research Project


Jun 25 2010

Promise and Mutual Benefit

Zekta Chan
Zekta Chan

Wonderful_world_poster1

The Film

On my way back Hong Kong (20 hour+ flight, that was a nightmare), I come across a movie named Wonderful World. The main character named Ben second guess every pure good intention from anyone and thus lead to a miserable life. Of course this is yet another evangelical film (Is that a word?) but the setup is worth a thought.

In World of Warcraft (finally something related), promises are fragile. Guild drama happens all the time. This happens in all virtual world, e.g. Eve Bank Scandal.

It’s trivial to said that, since the player can stop playing at anytime, having different names (e.g. server transfer and alts in Wow). They had little to pay for the consequence, breaking a promise (defecting) is easy if you have nothing to lose.

Cooperation in Economic Realm

Let’s investigate in term of game theory. In the well known game, Prisoner Dilemma (PD).
From Wikipedia

There are two players and a banker. Each player holds a set of two cards, one printed with the word “Cooperate” (as in, with each other), the other printed with “Defect” (the standard terminology for the game). Each player puts one card face-down in front of the banker. By laying them face down, the possibility of a player knowing the other player’s selection in advance is eliminated (although revealing one’s move does not affect the dominance analysis). At the end of the turn, the banker turns over both cards and gives out the payments accordingly.

Given two players, “red” and “blue”: if the red player defects and the blue player cooperate, the red player gets the Temptation to Defect payoff of 5 points while the blue player receives the Sucker’s payoff of 0 points. If both cooperate they get the Reward for Mutual Cooperation payoff of 3 points each, while if they both defect they get the Punishment for Mutual Defection payoff of 1 point. The checker board payoff matrix showing the payoffs is given below.

Example PD payoff matrix
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3, 3 0, 5
Defect 5, 0 1, 1

In “win-lose” terminology the table looks like this:

Cooperate Defect
Cooperate
win-win
lose much-win much
Defect
win much-lose much
lose-lose

In short, in a single game, player will always defect. Because they can’t predict what other player will choose, they’ll always be better off on defecting, assuming the worst case scenario. It sounds silly, since if they can co-operate together, they’ll be better off, but that’s what a rational player would do (Same as what Ben would do).

The Remedy

While a single game of PD(Prisoner Dilemma) always results in a bad ending, a repeated/iterated one do not. If the two players keep playing with each others for couples of game, said 10. They’ll be better off cooperating with each other. Since both cooperate (3*10) is always better than Both Defect (1*10).

However, there is a catch.

  • Forgiveness is a virtue, A player should always try to cooperate (since cooperate is more profitable) but no blindly. Otherwise they’ll be only be preyed on.
  • Revenge had it’s value, as long as the player refuse to cooperate in couples of turn if they got cheated. (To give opponent -ve gain from the cheat). Then both party will had mutual goal on not cheating
  • No matter how nice they played, on the last round both player will defect. (Since no more consequences will occur)

While in real life, we rely on humanity. But why risk on that ?
Setting up systems that favor the common goal, encourage cooperate and reject defect.

self-defeating 2

Self-defeating System

There are many system setup that it contradict its. Take hourly paid customer service as an example.
My father used to work in a casino as a card dealer.
If there is not gambler on the table, they can take a break, and wait for the customer.
Each dealer is acting as unfriendly (cold gaze for instance) as possible to avoid serving the client.
The problem is that the casino pools all the tips of dealers, and evenly split without any relation to their performance.
If they can have a little % from the tips they received. All the dealers will have a better incentive to server their client.

While setting up measure can increase the staff’s performance. Rewarding good performance if much simpler and direct. They’ll work out how to get more tips from customer (By providing better service).

Different Guild had different policy, but while most of the “Friendly Progressive Guild”* is self-defeating. The better gear you got the slower progress you’ll get.
By expecting boost to others in Guild.

In an Elite-Jerk Progressive Guild, however better gear get you into better runs and thus better reward.
The very nature and policy will determine the destiny of the System.

To Summary:
In order to keep Promise/Deal valid in virtual world, One must always ensure, honoring the contract provides more benefits than breaking it.
(It goes as far as Guild Membership level)

*You can had a progressive guild with friendly environment, however, a boost-required guild without entrance limit will always fail

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Jun 21 2010

Why 1/3 Gold Bid Fail

Zekta Chan
Zekta Chan

Further Argument on the 1/3 payment GDKP.

12376

If anyone got bored by this, I am sorry

Background Readings

Gevlon’s plan on improving the GDKP
solo-rewards-for-group-effort
PUG
rule-in-gold-bid

Summary :
Gevlon try to introduce an improvement to GDKP, since GDKP do not compensate the other bidder “enough” and encourage bidding. He suggest that the final bid’s 1/3 will go to the second bidder (Instead of going to the gold pool for the raid)

The Game

I’ll try to rephrase my argument.
A given loot had been auctioned
Let Player A maximum bid be 1000g (FPBP)
Let Player B maximum bid be 900g (SPBP)

Traditional GDKP

Player A would get the loot, -900g
Player B would get nothing
Raid gets 900g

Honest Gevlon’s competition,

Player A would get the loot, -900g
Player B would get 300g,
Raid gets 600g

Zekta’s Double Bidding

Player B finds a cooperator Player C. in which, he’ll always bid just before player B (With B’s Gold).

Auction will stop when Player A withdraw.
Player A bid on 1000g,
Player C bid on 1100g,
Player B bid on 1200g, and win the auction

Results:
Player A would get nothing
Player B would get loot, -1200g
Player C get 1200*1/3=400g.
Raid gets 800g

Player C gives back the gold to Player B (He’s just a bid dummy for player B)
In Summary,
Player B would get loot, -1200+400= -800g

Player A would get nothing
Player B would get loot, -800g
Raid gets 800g

In Summary

If taking my double fire bidding plan, Player B is better off in this situation, since he would want to loot for 900g, but he now get it for 800g.

In this case, the only benefactor is Player B, at the expenses of Both Player A (Getting the Loot he value 1000g with 900g) and Raid (Getting 900g pool).

The only way to counter that is player A also use “double fire” bidding plan, but then the result is the same as Traditional GDKP (with bidding on 200g).

WINGS1

The fallacy of Gevlon example

At his Bid Ninja assumption, he stated
“So FG offers SGBP and not a cent more. It’s unreasonable for SG to bid more now if he did not bid 20 seconds ago, and BN has no options.”

The item valued by the FP (first player) to the First Player Break Point (FPBP), state that, the player is willing to pay until FPBP. Although it provides 0 values to the NB, He also knew P1 want the item. The Trade will occur as long as SPBP < = Price <= FPBP. But not necessarily equals to SPBP.

While destroying the item provide no benefits to BN, but this option provide an effective threat to P1. Consider the similar case in Mutual assured destruction in cold war and Cuba Crisis.

Summary

1/3 Bidding do not improve any better than Traditional GDKP, while introduce extra complexity.

The double fire loop hole had to be fixed, before it’s become useful.

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